

THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN SMALL'S GENERAL
SOCIOLOGY.¹

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Professor Small's volume² just issued, although containing much less in the way of detailed psychological construction than was given in Professor Giddings's *Inductive Sociology*, is nevertheless of great interest to those who have followed, or desire to follow, the gradual development of a psychological standpoint and method in the treatment of social problems. The aspects of the volume which are of chief interest for social psychology may be considered under the following topics: (1) The Elements of the Social Process, (2) The Nature of the Social Process, (3) The Province of Social Psychology.

¹This number, dealing especially with topics in social psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor James H. Tufts.

²*General Sociology. An exposition of the main development in sociological theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer*, by Albion W. Small. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. xiii + 739. \$4.00 net.

The author states that the purpose of the book is to present neither a system of sociology nor a history of sociology, but rather a conspectus of present conceptions and lines of tendency, in which much space is given relatively to questions of scope and method. Its main thesis is that 'the central line in the path of methodological progress from Spencer to Ratzenhofer is marked by gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of social structures to real analysis of social processes.' In conformity with this thesis there are, for the first half, brief expositions of Spencer's structural view of society, then a brief exposition of Schäffle's functional view, followed by an extended exposition and interpretation of Ratzenhofer. In the last half, an extended account of sociological concepts is followed by a view of the psychical, ethical and technical problems in the social process. In the present article it goes without saying that no attempt is made to appraise the book as sociology, further than to say that to a layman such a conspectus of progress and tendencies appears to be very opportune.

1. *The Elements of the Social Process.*—Sociology seems definitely to have abandoned the 'individual' as the unit of analysis. The methodological ground for this may be very briefly stated, although I do not know whether the sociologist has put it in just this form. If individuals are our units, we are forced to explain a variety of results from identical causes. Or else we must say that individuals differ; and then we make, not individuals, but certain constitutive elements in individuals the ultimate units. What explains everything explains nothing. The question is, why do certain individuals act in one way, and others in another; or again, why do the same individuals act in one way at one time and in another way at another time? Professor Small (following Ratzenhofer) finds the social unit, and then the answer to these questions, in the concept of 'interests.' The social structure at any time is made up of more or less definitely organized interests; the historical process is the result of the conflict or union of interests. The various institutions, political, ecclesiastical, professional, industrial, etc., are devices, means, gradually brought into existence, to serve interests. Typical interests are security of existence, kinship, national, ecclesiastical, pecuniary, class, rank, and corporate. Each interest is at bottom exclusive, peremptory and insistent upon being satisfied. All the various interests may, however, be classed under six, health (including satisfaction of bodily appetites), wealth, knowledge, sociability, beauty, rightness.

It would seem that sociology is unquestionably on the right track in substituting interests for individuals as the unit of analysis. But certain difficulties, requiring further examination, at once present themselves. A minor question is as to the number and classification of interests proposed. Can all the interests which move man in society be classed under the six kinds named? To answer this we must understand whether we class and name the elements from the agent's standpoint or from the observer's, *i. e.*, the sociologist's standpoint. Is it a psychological or a teleological term, and if the latter, who is to fix the 'end' which serves as the standard? Professor Small answers that the term is to be used in sociology teleologically, although he also states that it makes little difference, for purposes of sociology, whether we define interests objectively as the ends toward which the life process moves, or as the ends which are actual objects of desire (subjective ends). It would seem, however, to make a decided difference in the number and classification of these ends. It is conceivable that the ends actually reached by a given man may be wealth or knowledge, while the actual conscious interest or desire is

simply to outstrip a rival. And this would be as true of communities in their activities directed toward improving the school system or building a navy as in the case of an individual. So, too, in every political campaign, besides those who are contending for spoils and those who are contending for good government, there is a considerable number who want to win, simply to have the satisfaction of winning. The instinct or interest of rivalry is certainly a most important subjective end, and it scarcely seems to be capable of inclusion under either of the heads named. Certainly also social psychology would have to take account of this interest and it is difficult to see how the sociologist can give a true picture of society without considering just such differences as are illustrated in the case of this particular interest.

A more important question is, which standpoint, viz., the subjective or the teleological, is more useful? It seems not a mere analogy, but a proper aid, to ask how we explain an individual's life-process. We cannot assume that either the ends toward which the process actually moves, or the conscious desires are the exclusive and all-sufficient explanation. Nor could we give an adequate statement in either 'objective' or 'subjective' terms. Just because the life process ranges from instinct to volition, and from selective intelligence to habit, because it is in an environment physical and social which both makes and is made by the nature of the process with its ends and interests, it is becoming less possible for the psychologist to fulfill his task by the employment of any fixed unit of analysis. Even the economist has abandoned the desire for wealth as a fixed entity. Will not the sociologist find it to be desirable, if his problem is to comprehend and explain the social process, to take a farther step, and treat interests not as units but as themselves modes to be accounted for and resolved? Men sometimes act from (subjective) interest; sometimes from tendencies toward ends not consciously recognized (instinct); sometimes from habit. Voluntary organizations, kinship groups, customs handed down by tradition, may all be said to represent interests, but they are very different in their origin and significance.

2. *The Social Process.* — The social process is defined as 'incessant reaction of persons prompted by interests that in part conflict with the interests of their fellows, and in part comport with the interests of others.' Conflict is the 'conspicuous element,' especially in the earlier phases. Three stages are specified as struggle, moralization (by which is meant, apparently, regulation by a group as contrasted with an individual standard on the one hand, or a universal standard on the other), socialization. Professor Small recog-

nizes that the relation of conflict and coöperation is not one of antecedent and consequent in time. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of social psychology it may be questioned whether the perspective is a true one which places so much stress on the struggle aspect of the earlier phases of the social process. Every war or conflict between groups implies coöperation (within the groups); and their internal coöperation is fully as significant as the external conflict.

On the other hand there are many kinds and degrees of struggle in modern life which were unknown in primitive conditions. Modern society has less *violent* struggles, but has far more of competition than more primitive life. An Indian tribe knows no such economic struggle as that which marks our city life. "A whole tribe of Indians might starve, a single Indian never." The savage chief cannot comprehend the individualism which is symbolized by the stone palace of the rich and the filthy tenement of the poor standing side by side.

Again, as regards the increase of socialization, it is necessary to bear in mind also the concomitants of increasing wants and therefore of new incentives to struggle, not to speak of the new instruments for carrying on contests. There is undoubtedly more socialization as society progresses. The power of the social whole impresses more and more the members, as it has more to offer of contents, such as art, science, justice, which appeal to social rather than to exclusive interests. The social whole is thus itself constantly creating the capacity by which it is appreciated and the desire by which it is sought. But, on the other hand, the process is constantly awakening new interests of the exclusive sort. No savage, barbarous, or semi-civilized chief ever planned a campaign so comprehensively and probably so coldly, so far as the fate of other interests is concerned, as a modern corporation. In fact, one of the happy touches of Professor Small's book is the comment that corporations have no souls because they are merely a single abstract interest. Now the earlier stages of society have no such sharply organized and abstract interests. We are impressed by the struggles of earlier stages because they are violent and obvious. We may easily overlook both the manifold struggles of the civilized, and the amount of coöperation in the savage life.

This suggests that the social process might be more fruitfully interpreted in terms of another pair of categories, which Professor Small recognizes but does not utilize extensively, viz., individualization (including definition of aims, self-control, and freedom) and socializa-

tion. This twofold process can certainly be traced both objectively in institutions and psychologically in the form and content of ideals, desires, and volition. The individual is recognized to be a social outcome, not a social unit; many of his interests are also social outcomes rather than social units.

3. *The Province of Social Psychology.*—Formulations of the specific problems of social psychology have recently appeared from Professor Thomas, summarized in the BULLETIN of November, 1904, and by Professor Ross, summarized in this number. Professor Small gives a general rather than a specific statement. Social psychology is 'the restatement of the social process in terms of purpose and choice.' This definition aims to mark out the field as distinct from biology on the one hand, and individual psychology on the other. As compared with the latter the problem is 'to generalize the purpose reactions that occur in typical situations.' The most general classification of cases is into two groups; *i. e.*, first, cases in which mass-valuations are adopted by the individual; second, cases in which individual valuations are communicated to the mass. This yields the main questions: "Through what appeal to interest does a group purpose come to be adopted as an individual purpose? and, Through what appeal to interest does an individual purpose come to be adopted as a group purpose?" As contrasted with biology the emphasis lies on the conception of purpose and choice. This, in contrast with such a category as 'imitation.'

As regards the basis of distinction from individual psychology, there is coming to be a consensus of opinion that the field must lie in the consciousness of the individual as affected by his group relations. But it is probable that it will not be practically desirable, whatever the theoretical definition of the field, to limit such relations to the purposes and choices. In the study of the individual, instinct and habit are doubtless biological and physiological facts, but the psychologist can scarcely get on without them. So the action of society upon the individual is often in ways that do not involve conscious choice by the individual. For example the phenomenon of religious conversion may be due in part to conscious choice in response to group stimulus. But the *kind* of experience, its imagery and in part its emotional coloring, will depend largely upon suggestions adopted without any conscious choice. Or, to take Professor Small's illustration of the part played by volition, even in the following of a fashion. In criticising Tarde's doctrine of imitation, he very justly points out that not every suggestion is accepted. Not every attempted style of hat 'goes.' It

must suit the buyer. This must certainly be admitted. Nevertheless there is another side. The buyer's choice is not unconditioned, free construction of desirable headgear; it is limited to two or three alternatives. The buyer may choose between certain copies, but the copies are set for him. And along with the elements which he takes because he wants them, he takes many others which are simply a part of the hat, and therefore have to be taken whether he will or not. Or, in the more complex case of suggestions from human action or language or institutions, many features are adopted without receiving any focusing of attention upon themselves. There is thus very much in the stuff out of which the individual and the social builds up its structures which is simply taken by suggestion without any conscious volition. This is the element of truth in the theory of Tarde. We may cordially agree that we have complete social consciousness and social activity when, as social groups, we act for reasons and with definite ends, but is not this for social, as for individual psychology, a limiting ideal rather than an exclusive test of the psychological?

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Du Rôle de l'Individu dans le Déterminisme Social. D. DRAGHISCESCO. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1904. Pp. 367.

Le Problème du Déterminisme Social, Déterminisme biologique et Déterminisme social. D. DRAGHISCESCO. Paris, Editions de la Grande France, 1903. Pp. 99.

M. Draghiscesco, in a brochure entitled *Le Problème du Déterminisme Social* and in a book following it a year later, *Du Rôle de l'Individu dans le Déterminisme Social*, has presented a statement of the relation of sociology and psychology that in any case throws into strong relief the problems involved in the relations of these sciences.

In his earlier work M. Draghiscesco is occupied with the difference which he conceives to exist between the social sciences and the positivistic natural sciences. These latter, according to him, serve to prophesy the future through a study of the past. The past yields them the facts which in their uniformity and invariability reveal the laws that determine the necessary succession of events in the future. To this group of sciences biology must belong, and if the individual is to be defined and analyzed by a physiology and a psychology dependent upon physiology, and a sociology that follows the same lead, the determinism of the social sciences will be that of biology.

Against this the author makes a vigorous protest. The basis of this protest is that the events of consciousness can not be predicated, because they spring from a source which lies higher than that of natural phenomena. In the first place he finds that the phenomena of consciousness are of a totally different character. They are to a large degree rational and teleological in their structure, while the natural phenomena are mechanical. From this he goes on to discuss the nature of the relation of the body and consciousness. The hypothesis that consciousness is an epiphenomenon is rejected because of the evident efficacy of consciousness in our conduct, while the parallel doctrines of materialism and spiritualism are impaled upon their metaphysical contradictions and implications.

The alternative that the author substitutes for these hypotheses is that of society, or a general social consciousness (it is impossible to determine just which of these he has in mind), which is the matrix out

of which individual consciousness arises. Social relationships are real, objective, and according to the author the source of all states of consciousness which lie above the barest sensation and impulse. Instead therefore of a brain with its epiphenomenon of consciousness, that is but the shadow of a reality, there stands the social plexus which is not only there as a web and woof of facts but is after all the very stuff of consciousness. The simpler unreflective phases of consciousness would thus be dependent upon the physiological determinism of the physical body, while the higher processes out of which the conscious individual arises would arise out of and be dependent upon the social complex and its determinism, a determinism which is teleological while the former is mechanical. The author brings into this discussion the problem of the inheritance of acquired traits, coming to the conclusion that only those traits can be handed down which arise out of permanent conditions in the environment, and which will continue to have the same value for descendent forms that they had for those parent forms in which the variation arose. He concludes from this that conditions so unstable and variant as those of the social environment cannot possibly be the ground for the inheritance of the acquired traits of conscious life. Thus there appears another type of inheritance in the social world through which acquired characteristics are handed down by the way of social institutions. The basis for inheritance in the biological world is that the results of development have been so assimilated into the texture of the biological matter, that the child-form brings its characteristics fully determined with it into the world; while in the social world the form comes as nearly as possible as a white page with no characteristics as yet inscribed upon it, but ready for the determination of its social environment through education and training. Thus a capital distinction between the two worlds is made, which seems to M. Draghiscesco of the greatest moment.

As I have indicated, there is an entire lack of analysis of this dependence upon the social environment. At one time the author implies that the social complex is an antecedent objective environment existing before the consciousness of which it is the substratum in some sense. At another he implies that there is a general social consciousness out of which the individual consciousness arises. While seeming to reject Wundt's position that this social consciousness must appear in that of individuals, he nowhere discusses adequately this assumption, nor its relation to a theory of cognitive consciousness.

Add to this that the author assumes that the events in the world of

consciousness may result from causation without any fixed or recurrent series, and finally that, following the steps of Tarde, he suggests that the social world is but young in comparison with the physical; that the countless ages requisite to account for the building up of the solar system and the surface of one of its planets have resulted through continuous evolution in an almost unvarying course of events; that the social world is by comparison but in an age of chaos, comparable to the early nebular stage of the solar system; that the scientists who should have speculated in the beginnings of the nebular period could not have possibly predicted the coming events within the system as they can now predict with certainty an eclipse; and we see that a great variety of considerations on entirely different logical levels are brought forward. At one point he suggests that a coming period is conceivable when such an evolution shall have taken place within the social world, that a complete integration of society will take place, so that the processes of law and method will have completely passed into the consciousness of mankind and all its actions will be determined, as are the mechanical events of the physical world. At another point he implies that the initiative of consciousness makes any such result an impossibility.

When we turn to M. Draghiscesco's book on the rôle of the individual in social determinism, we find a more detailed effort to prove the identification of sociology and psychology, which is the ultimate thesis of his brochure. He again insists that the physical world cannot be the ground for the explanation of consciousness because of the extreme complexity of the conscious content. For the author the physical world is extremely simple, made up of series which are ever recurring without exception, offering no variety on the one hand nor any principle of synthesis on the other. Variety and synthetic activity are accepted as the conditions of our personal consciousness, and the infinite variety of the physical world and its syntheses are somewhat contemptuously dismissed as quite inadequate to the awakening of human reflective consciousness while they may suffice for the stimulation of the life processes of lower animal forms. It is then to the social environment that we must look for the conditions under which reflection can appear.

The social processes, furthermore, run parallel with the psychological. The whole social evolution is a process of integration, and this integration has its two phases which answer directly to the two demands of reflective consciousness. All history shows society continually sweeping more and more communities into each other, while

this very process of increasing the extent of society involves a differentiation of new social functions and a more profound organization than could have existed in any of the smaller communities. This movement is so continuous and incessant that no limit can be put to it except the final integration of the race, though step by step with this spread of community-life must go increased depth and intensity of social consciousness. Here, then, we have the continual occurrence of new and unceasing synthesis.

If we examine the processes of consciousness and the social processes more in detail we find that perception is expressed in terms of modern psychology as a form of suggestion, that association of ideas comes back to the processes of attention and repetition, and that attention is but the subjective expression of the prestige, the authority with which some element in the environment commands us, while repetition is an affair of education if we take education in its largest sense. But suggestion and prestige, authority and education can only be conceived from the social point of view. Advancing to imagination, it is to be identified with invention, and abstraction with the operation of social control through laws and customs, while voluntary activity finds its great and at bottom only expression in what M. Draghiscresco defines as the genius. The genius is the individual who gives expression to the new law and through his identification with his environment on the one side, and his initiative on the other, impresses the idea upon the community, and raises the mass up to it, so that the idea becomes a part of the consciousness of the whole society. These social laws are inculcated on the younger generation through all the social institutions. The changes that take place must do so through the genius who makes advance possible, who is the social will. Advance is necessary because of the very process of continued social integration which involves ceaseless absorption of new content and as ceaseless new organization. The conclusion of the whole matter is that psychology is but applied pedagogy, the statement in terms of the individual process of the operations by which society controls its members and takes the steps in advance which a necessary social integration involves. Thus sociology and psychology become identified, being but the same science looking out upon the same field through different windows.

It seems to the reviewer a matter of no great importance that a complete parallelism can be traced between consciousness and any environment which it knows. Knowledge is universally recognized as constructive, so that such a parallelism between the process and the product

is but to be expected. Surely just what M. Draghiscesco abuses the physiological psychologist for doing is what he has done with no better warrant as a social psychologist. The psychologist has pointed out that the physical world is made up of our representations, that its laws are but the associations of our ideas, and that its objects have the unity of our synthetic apperception. If it were conceivable that a consciousness could derive a power of synthesis from the syntheses which affect it through its environment, certainly these could be found in the world of physical science. James Mill deduced the association of ideas from the succession of events in physical nature about us. If the social stimulus can command our attention, certainly the physical has exerted this authority for still longer periods, and its objects have given forth the suggestions which native impulses have responded to in naïve perception. Natural law certainly presents classical instances of abstraction, and who shall draw the line between impulse and the will? There is, however, a problem brought out here which deserves a more profound analysis than is granted it by M. Draghiscesco. It is the problem of the relation of the individual with whom psychology deals to the process of that consciousness as a whole. On the one side this is peculiarly a problem of social psychology, for the question at once arises as to whether the individual with whom the psychologist deals is the same as the individual of the sociologist. Our author insists that they are the same and that the sciences are but one science.

There is one point of view from which the social object seems essentially different from that of physical perception. The other selves stand upon a different basis from that of physical objects. Physical objects are merely objects of perception, while the other selves are perceiving subjects as well as perceived objects. The question arises whether this difference has any significance for the process of cognition. I take it that it is the feeling of this difference which lies behind the position of the author that the social consciousness stands upon a higher plane than that of physical consciousness, and provides the mechanism of cognition itself. His assumption is that reflective, representative consciousness is essentially a social consciousness.

Stated in somewhat different terms the position is this: cognition is essentially a synthetic process which involves an organizing self, but this self arises only in so far as other selves, the alii, appear in consciousness. Professor Baldwin in his *Mental Development* has described, perhaps, as satisfactorily as any psychologist, the process by which the child's own personality arises out of the differentiation of a

general social consciousness into an ego and alii. And these other selves are accepted as subjects like unto the knowing subject, and therefore unlike the known object. This fact from the standpoint of ethics is of capital importance. As Kant has stated it, these other selves cannot be mere means as are the physical objects. They must be recognized as ends. Has the fact a like importance for the psychology of cognition?

If we turn to immediate consciousness we find no direct evidence of a peculiar cognitive value inhering in our social perceptions in comparison with the physical perceptions. One is quite as real as the other. From the psychological point of view the question becomes this: does introspection present the knowing self to the knower, as a social content implying necessarily other selves, while the known physical object is subject to analysis into states that must be referred to this self? If this were the case, we might indeed deduce the whole cognitive process out of a consciousness which was primarily social and secondarily physical. But the fact is that this self which our introspection reveals is the so-called empirical self, and is just as much a construct as the physical object. A constructing self never appears as the object of introspection. He can no more be got on to the dissecting table than Kant's transcendental ego. It is true that we cannot construct empirical selves without constructing other selves. It is equally true that we cannot construct our physical bodies as objects without constructing other physical objects, and it is a piece of Berkeleyan idealism to refer the consciousness of physical objects to the consciousness of the empirical self, giving precedence in reality to the latter over the former. It is hard to see that psychology as an analysis of reflective consciousness is essentially social in its character.

There is another attitude of the author which bears more or less directly on this question. He assumes that the physical sciences give us a fixed theory of nature that does not change, that is not subject to the constant reconstructions which social theories undergo. The assumption is a groundless one. It would be difficult for social theory to change much more rapidly or more fundamentally than has the theory of matter within the last half century. The fact is that our attitude toward physical theory is exactly the same as that toward social theory. Every new hypothesis brings with it a radical change of such a character that it would have been impossible for the scientist to have predicted the new hypothesis from the fullest possible knowledge of the world under the old. From a Ptolemaic point of view one could never have argued to or predicted the Copernican. And it is

the essence not only of Pragmatism but of most of the other modern philosophical doctrines of knowledge, to call this scientific knowledge as really teleological as that of the social sciences. The point that needs to be emphasized is that reflective consciousness, when it meets an essential difficulty and forms an hypothesis to solve this problem, has just the same attitude toward its social theories as that which it holds towards physical theories, and *vice versa*. The whole body of knowledge is open to reconstruction.

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Les Mensonges du Caractère. FR. PAULHAN. Paris, 1905. Pp. 276.

To discover what truth there is in lying seems to be the object of M. Paulhan's artistic, suggestive, and paradoxical study of simulation — its protean variations with different types of character, its commanding rôle in the complexities of social life, and its final sublimation as a sociological and philosophical principle.

The author begins by drawing a fundamental distinction between two types of character. Under the first belong those who conceal, or inhibit, their real disposition. Under the second belong those who pretend to express traits, ideas, sentiments, etc., which they do not really have. The former are negative; they dissimulate. The latter are positive; they simulate. Both tendencies may exist in the same character. All degrees of preponderance of one or the other may be noted in different characters, and even, in some instances, in the same character.

The first type the author discusses at length in Part I. under the head of 'Feigned Indifference.' A brief review cannot do justice to the skill with which the author penetrates this mask and illuminates the interior with his keen and brilliant analysis. Feigned indifference is a form of self-protection. Given, on the one hand, a self characterized by great sensitiveness, endowed with capacities for deep affection and reflective thought, a self in whom *la vie intérieure* predominates with its natural inhibitions of overt action; and given, on the other hand, a harsh or niggardly environment, a crude, unsympathetic *milieu*; and you have conditions favorable to the development of feigned indifference, of assumed coldness and reserve. Frequently the mask does not persist as a mask. By usage it clings closer and closer to the features and ends by becoming a part of the real character — a *persona*. The character insensibly tends to become what it dissimulates.

The second type of character, what we should probably label the 'motor' type, the author discusses at length in Part II. under the head of 'Feigned Sensitiveness.' Simulation of indifference isolates. Simulation of sensitiveness to the interests of others, to their ideas and sentiments, unites. Both have a practical social justification. Amid the alarms and conflicts in which our lives are cast we must be prepared either to erect a barricade or to make a sally, according to the nature of the ground and the relative strength of the enemy.

The value of the book lies chiefly in its descriptive analyses of typical varieties of deception and of self-deception as indices to individual differences in temperament. The author is less successful in his more fundamental explanations and generalizations. His aim, as I understand it, is practically to substantiate the psalmist's assertion that all men are liars—not merely on a statistical basis, but on a psychological and philosophical basis. Not all men, but Man, is inherently, normally, necessarily and universally a liar. The author even goes so far as to suggest by way of an extreme illustration that perhaps Desdemona simulated fidelity in such a way as to deceive Shakespeare!

Psychologically, the argument, briefly summarized, is to this effect: A volitional act is the outcome of conflicting desires and impulses. It does not express them all. It represents only the victorious desire or impulse. There is an inherent discrepancy, according to this mechanistic analysis, between the product of volition and the process of volition. This discrepancy is the germ of simulation and dissimulation. There is, again, a discrepancy between the image, or ideal, and actual conditions. Philosophically the outcome amounts to a profound scepticism of reality. All individual life, all social life, would become impossible if we were to know things as they really are. Dwell not too long on the meaning of life, on its value, its rôle in the world, lest the desire to live perish within you (p. 120).

Yet though conceived in volitional discrepancy, simulation, we are told paradoxically, is derived from our passion for harmony in the face of universal discord. To offer simulation, the veil or ill-concealing mask of discord, conflict, strategy, and suspicion, in response to a passion for harmony, is likely to strike the Anglo-Saxon mind as a pretty poor sort of substitute. With all the love for subtle distinctions and knife-edge partitions which characterizes this work, the distinction between a construction—and simulation unquestionably is a construction—that has for its essential aim the blocking of intercourse, the arrest of movement, and a construction that has for its aim the promotion of better mutual understanding seems to have been ignored.

It would be interesting to know what relation this attempt to make simulation a great socializing instinct and agency has to similar attempts made in behalf of imitation.

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Études sur la Sélection chez l'Homme. Dr. PAUL JACOBY. Avant-propos par M. GABRIEL TARDE. 2^e éd., rev. et augm. Paris, F. Alcan, 1904. Pp. xvii + 620.

The first edition of Dr. Jacoby's book appeared in 1881, when it was the brilliant thing to identify genius and crime with each other and with degeneracies of various sorts. This work fell in with the general current of the time, but proved of more lasting value than those of the Italian school of criminologists. Dr. Jacoby is at some pains to point out, in this edition at least, that most cases of what is generally called crime and madness are at quite opposite ends of the scale in point of view of their symptoms. The pessimistic tone of the work has, however, not lessened in its later edition, nor has the author seen reasons for regarding the greatest achievements of mankind other than as the steps taken on the road toward degeneracy.

The explicit aim of the work is to show the process of selection in the development of the human animal. There can be no question of the learning and industry of the author. The two instances of selection in human history which he has presented are the histories of families who have held for a number of generations royal power, and the fate of talented families in France during the eighteenth century. Under the Roman Empire he follows the descendants of Augustus to Nero with unwearying detail. Then, with more conciseness, he deals with the principal dynasties of Europe from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The results of the selective action of the peculiar social position of the family of Augustus he sums up as follows: "Here is a family which nature and fortune had treated as their favorite child. Beauty, exceptional intelligence, talents of all sorts—nature and fortune had lavished their gifts upon it. If the first generation was not numerous—one son and one daughter—the second counted already from a dozen to fifteen members. And yet this family is represented in its fourth generation only by a monstrous and grotesque actor, abject and sanguinary, soiled by all the vices and all the crimes, and whose only child died in the cradle. And to reach this actor the family passes through imbecility, epilepsy, nervous affections, incest, parricide, fratricide, shamelessness, infamous and

monstrous debauches, the bloodiest ferocity, sterility, premature death, assassination, poisoning, suicide, drunkenness, misfortune and disgrace" (pp. 317 f.).

The European dynasties reveal as complete family disintegration and disappearance. And if one wishes to follow this disintegration into its details of degeneration, its neuropathies and psychopathies, and its ultimate, unavoidable and fortunate sterility, he has only to turn over the pages crowded with the distressing, sickening, and finally monotonous diagnosis of this royal clinic.

The story of the remarkable men and their families in France during the eighteenth century passes over into the study of the city. The city is the group that attracts the remarkably endowed from the whole country. Here those who rise above the level of common humanity intermarry, and selection of talent takes place in the sense of the biologist. A moment's thought will at once call up the evidence which the author must present of degeneration emphasized in the statistics of city life and death. Beside these and the consideration of the acknowledged early dying out of the families of remarkable men, there is a chapter on the history of the world's aristocracies, including the Spartan citizens, the puritan aristocracy of Berne, and the nobility of England. It is a commonplace of history that there has been no aristocracy, however good or bad its habits and blood, which has not in a comparatively few generations run out, unless it has continued its existence by additions from the outside.

In such an investigation as this there are two factors intimately related: selection and heredity. Yet they by no means are uniformly causally active. For example, polydactylism or albinism are hereditary, but the possession of an abnormal number of fingers does not lead to intermarriage among those who have this peculiarity. For the purposes of this study it is necessary that hereditary conditions should be found which at the same time lead to interbreeding of those who are subject to these conditions. The author — who is an alienist — naturally turned his attention to nervous troubles which, while being hereditary in a prominent degree, are generally conceived of as influenced by social conditions. Supposing therefore that the data and the interpretation of the statistics are adequate, the question still remains, as to how far it is that the social conditions which are unquestionably responsible for the selection, *i. e.*, the intermarrying of those within a certain social class, are also necessarily responsible for the degeneration which accompanies this social differentiation. Belonging to an aristocratic class is unquestionably the cause of aristocratic selection,

i. e., of the continual intermarriage of those belonging to that class. It has yet to be proved that the degeneration, which has been noted in aristocracies for example, is due to the social differentiation and the selection that accompanies it.

Dr. Jacoby's proof of his doctrine it is a little difficult to disentangle. The seeming progress of the argument is this: a display of the most detailed and presumably typical form of the degeneration which he is discussing; second, the presentation of a number of examples of the same process, under the same conditions; finally, the generalization of the causes and effects of this degeneration as found in large social groups. The first step is a minute medico-psychological analysis of the different members of the house of Augustus. Here we are familiarized with a certain unvarying course of the disease. The second step presents us with a more summary display of analogous phenomena among the dynasties of Europe from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Finally, the men of talent and their families lead us up to the city as the social organism where just such a differentiation and selection is going on, on a grand scale, and the table of nervous and mental disorders that are in evidence in urban life seems to complete the proof.

There are certain very evident replies that can be made to this argument. The comparative wealth and the power of monarchs and aristocracies give them opportunities for dissipation with little restraint, and dissipation, carried to excess, is a recognized cause of all the procession of nervous and mental disorders here catalogued. Dr. Jacoby's answer to this argument is, first, that such sober and self-controlled aristocracies as those of Lacædemonia and of Berne have not shown their ability to maintain themselves, but have died out as surely as have the riotous and noble classes of Europe, while on the other hand these noble classes whether serious or dissipated have all lived in better hygienic conditions than the poverty-stricken masses who have swarmed in the midst of their misery and filth. The constant cause that is present, while other supposed causes are now present and now absent, is the social differentiation and selection. The second rebuttal offered is that the dissipation here is frequently not a cause but an effect.

To these, there are two replies that can be made. In the first place this series of neuro- and psychopathic events that lead up to the extinction of a family are not proved to be the only ones which precede such a result. It is possible for a family to disappear without passing through the wild excesses and mental aberrations of the house of

Augustus. For example, the original New England society is approaching extinction, if we can trust present statistics, but the antecedents are as far from the course of events laid out by the author as possible.

In the second place, while the conditions that lead up to dissipation are not always the mere presence of opportunity and the absence of restraint, the social causes that predispose to such dissipation are by no means always of the neuropathic order. Unhealthful social ideals, ennui because of the absence of any active interest in life, etc., may predispose a perfectly healthy nature to dissipation. The situation is indefinitely more complicated both biologically and socially than is implied in the formula of Dr. Jacoby.

It is especially necessary to insist upon this from the point of view of the final generalization of the book. "From the vast human mass have arisen individuals, families and races, which tend to elevate themselves above the common level. They have climbed painfully the abrupt heights, have arrived at the summits—of power, of wealth, of intelligence, of talent—and once there, they are precipitated to the bottom, and disappear in the abysses of madness and degeneracy. * * * Men seem to have been organized—if we may be allowed to express ourselves thus—with a view to equality. All distinction in classes—political, economic and intellectual—and all selection which is the natural and logical consequence of these distinctions, are equally fatal to humanity, to the elect as well as to the rest of men, producing lack among the latter, and excess among the former of the element which is the principle of the differentiation of the class. * * * But nature seems to wish to avenge herself for this violation of her laws, striking cruelly the chosen, the fortunate, pursuing them to the fourth, the seventh generation" (pp. 616 and 618).

In other words the unusual and exceptional man, whatever be the peculiarity that distinguishes him from the crowd, is an unnatural growth in human society, and as soon as selection takes place on the basis of this unnatural position of his, the unnatural character of the man passes over in his posterity into degeneration. The proof is that all classes in the history of human society have tended to die out; but classes are groups which have been selected out on the basis of some social peculiarity, and have interbred with each other so that continual selection with reference to this peculiarity has been the result.

As before noted the problem is indefinitely more complex than this statement of Dr. Jacoby implies. It is primarily a question of the persistence of the family, but the family biologically defined and

socially defined are two different things, and any investigation that would carry conviction would have to be based on the histories of families among the mass of mankind as well as within its 'classes.' How persistent is the average family? Does it die out by a process of degeneration? The reader who is not trained either as an alienist nor as a statistician feels that this wealth of specific details must be interpreted on the basis of a larger and more massive body of facts than is here presented.

There is another implication which is not made specific but which is constantly felt in reading Dr. Jacoby's work. It is that the exceptional man is unnatural, abnormal, and that even if he performs a valuable social function he does it at the expense of his own disintegration. The psychological justification for this is given in part, when analyzing the position of the autocratic ruler, such as the Roman emperor. Unfortunately this analysis is not extended to other exceptional individuals with whom the work is later occupied. Still it goes far to account for the author's doctrine and bias.

The author, as alienist, explains the phenomena of insanity, in a great degree, not by the abnormal increase in power of some impulse, but by the weakening of the self, the ego. The basis of all conscious activity is the reflex, which may however be inhibited by other reflexes. The perceptions and ideas which arise in consciousness tend to pass over into action through these reflexes unless so checked. Organized conscious control, therefore, depends on the presence of a group of ideas which hold in check the different ideas and their reflexes arising in consciousness through association. The self, or ego, is such a group of ideas, strongly interrelated, persistent through powerful associations, which acts therefore as an arbiter in the struggles of ideas to rise above the threshold and become effective through conduct. Education is the process of forming such an organized group of ideas into a self, and mental disease is the disintegration of this self. In a word Dr. Jacoby's psychology is Herbartian, which shows the same mechanical adaptability to the phenomena of psychiatry that has characterized it in pedagogy.

The autocrat is shown to lack the possibility of forming any such self as is above described, or if such can be conceived of as arising in him through education, it must be enfeebled by his own conditions of life. "Power must enfeeble the will, the self, and render the man thus less capable of resisting his desires, his instincts, his suggestions, and reinforce therefore reflex action and render more direct the transformation of perception into movement, into action, in annulling more

or less the activity of the controlling centers. Power, by its moral influence on the personality, should produce in the cerebral life a functional trouble, the nature and character of which are identical with that which we find at the beginning of mental diseases and serious nervous affections" (p. 30).

This makes a brilliant introduction for the study of the early Cæsars, though it utterly fails to explain Trajan, Aurelian, Marcus Aurelius, in whom power itself had become a functional activity that carried with it its own control. From such emperors we go by an unbroken series to the executive officers of monarchies and republics, whose power is so normal an expression of human social conduct that its control arises out of the very situation which has bestowed it upon the individual. Autocracy, such as that of the Cæsars, can be readily admitted to be a predisposition to mental derangement. Tiberius exclaimed to his friends, "*Ignoros, quanta bellua esset Imperium.*" But the absolute power of the competent general, of the industrial engineer, of the competent expert in any direction, has no such tendency, and the psychology of Dr. Jacoby carries with it no comprehension for this fundamental difference between the lawless autocrat and the expert; for the talented individual of any sort, in so far as he becomes a power in the community, in so far as he comes under the rubrics of Dr. Jacoby's investigation, is essentially an expert. For him the self is not a functional entity that arises out of and exists with the social relations that make it possible, but an intellectual mechanism, which arises by a series of associations of ideas. These associations may be strengthened by education and the influence of the social environment, but that social function renders any endowment, any group of powers however exceptional, a normal material out of which to build up a self, is a conception that does not belong to Herbartian social psychology nor has it entered into the ideas out of which this book has arisen. The psychological point of view, therefore, from which the material of the book should be interpreted, if this is correct, is that of determining how far the lack of social function, and hence of control, has been responsible for the degeneration and extinction of privileged classes. Biological interpretation would show how far selection has served to emphasize the socially abnormal characteristics of these groups and the psychopathic and neuropathic results of these abnormal conditions.

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PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS, CLASSES, RACES.

Mass and Class. A Survey of Social Conditions. W. J. GHENT.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1905.

This book consists principally of an outline of the various classes in society to-day, with a brief theory of their origin and their relative influence and the ideals set by them. More space is given to the trading class and the reign of graft than to other topics, as that class is the most influential in our own country and the present prevalent corrupt conditions are the direct result of its ideals.

To the psychologist the book is of interest on account of its frequent references to mental development as the basis of social changes. The theory advanced is as follows: All human action springs from interest, and physical and temporary interests have always been in the ascendant. The economic motive is always the most important one, and all men's habits of thinking and feeling and their notions of right and wrong rest for the most part upon the prevailing mode of production and exchange of goods.

Men are not indeed conscious of this, nor is this the only motive. We have unquestionable instances of acts performed in pure heroism. But the consciences of men are greatly quickened to overcome injustice when they can thereby also secure a foreign market, and the search for a foreign market often takes on the aspect of a holy war through the transmuting alchemy of the mind. The actual effect of the preaching of ideals may be set down as a negligible quantity, if following those ideals involves economic loss.

The prevailing mode of production determines in large part what is moral or immoral, and the ruling class are the formulators of the code. There are always two sets of virtues, one for the working class and one for the enjoying class. Under feudalism, the principal virtue for the workers was fidelity, under the present régime, liberty—that is, liberty or freedom from organized labor. Under all régimes, industry and obedience are the prime requisites.

An economic class is one whose economic functions and interests are similar. Out of this similarity of function develop like feelings and acts under like conditions of employment, and the individual instinctively develops the practice of acting in unison with others of his own class. If the individual changes his economic function, his feelings and convictions also change, the employer who was formerly a workman now holding views with his own class against unions, etc.

If we divide the workers of America into classes according to their economic functions we have the following classes: the wage-earning producers; the self-employing producers — principally farmers and handicraftsmen; the social servants — the educators, physicians, clergymen, artists, and writers; the traders, divided into manufacturers or dealers in commodities, and financiers; and finally, the retainers — lawyers, clerks, employees in domestic and personal service, and politicians.

Each of these classes tends to develop its own ethical code, and these codes are in opposition in so far as the underlying economic interests of the classes are, and only in so far. It is for the economic interest, for instance, of the social servant to teach the code of the trader, and hence we see many of our ministers and teachers upholding the traders in their practices, though in direct contradiction to Christ's teachings. They thus become retainers instead of social servants.

Among producers, the ethics of usefulness and of fellowship are held to be fundamental, but as these are opposed to the traders' interests, the traders oppose them as immoral. The trader, on the other hand, upholds the keeping of a contract, no matter what its conditions, as the supreme morality, and insists that the maker of the contract takes his own risks of being deceived. As a result we get the reign of graft and the present struggle between capital and labor. But graft is essential to the trader's life, and will therefore continue until its necessity is abolished by a coöperative commonwealth.

Probably most psychologists would attach more importance to the part played by ideals than the author does, but in tracing back our present conditions of war between labor and capital to a play of motives that were the direct result of the rapid economic development of our country, he is fundamentally correct. The book is to be criticised in this respect as being too schematic, as not going sufficiently into detail to be at all satisfactory to one's historical sense.

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La Psychologie de l'Argot. R. DE LA GRASSERIE. *Revue Philos.*, Sept., 1905.

A field of language much neglected by the social psychologist is that of the '*argot*' (jargon, lingo). The word *argot* is not accurately descriptive of the subject matter to be discussed, since it commonly designates the speech used by criminals. The Greek term *glose*

(tongue) is a convenient technical term. 'Language' refers to the distinctive tongue used by a nation; a 'dialect' is a variation of this as to idiom and vocabulary, resulting from geographical situation; a 'glose' is a deviation from the normal language which registers differences in mental and physical traits that run parallel with differences in occupations, pursuits, and habits of the various social classes. Some are inferior, some superior to the standard language. The inferior gloses or catagloses are of three grades, the 'accoglose,' used at home among near of kin; the 'demoglose,' used by the common people; and the 'cryptoglose,' used principally by criminals. The demoglose furnishes typical and interesting material. An analysis of it shows a tendency to translate all abstract ideas into concrete expressions charged with imagery of a vigorously picturesque sort. *Avoir une idée fixe, c'est avoir une araignée au plafond*, or as a small American boy would say, 'a bat in your belfry.' The man of the common people possesses little but his own body and his tools, and this is reflected in his speech. *Avoir de l'influence, c'est avoir le bras long*. The frequent recourse to the animal world for imagery the author considers a kind of linguistic totemism. *Le paresseux est le lézard* (cf. 'clam,' 'lobster,' 'jay'). The vegetable kingdom too is employed. *Un homme important est un gros légume*. There is an attitude of literal honesty and aggressive sincerity in the insistence of this class in calling *un chat, un chat* (a spade, a spade). An instinct of hostility toward upper classes aggravates this habit of plain speech into an abusive stripping off of all euphemistic delicacy which may have been given to a phrase by the upper classes, and reclothing it in homely, often coarse, dress. Or reversing the process, they refine ironically a common situation by couching it in extravagantly high-sounding phraseology.

Though the gloses serve as lines of demarcation among social classes yet communication between classes is possible. A member of a superior class knows more than one glose and there is a special or 'reverential glose' which an inferior uses when he addresses a superior. The man of the middle class uses the accoglose in the bosom of his family, but when a sufficiently stimulating occasion occurs, an oratorical endeavor, for instance, he can rise to the effort of a 'glose soutenu.' However, he drops with relief into his familiar vernacular as soon as the pressure abates.

Besides hostility of one class for another, three other fundamental instincts contribute to the forming of gloses; the secretive instinct which moves one class deliberately to exclude and mystify another by

the use of language intelligible only to the initiated; the impulse to follow along the line of least resistance, that is, of least mental effort, as instanced in the use of abbreviations and in the translation of abstract terms into incisive and suggestive concrete expressions; finally the impulse, most fundamental and connected closely with the secretive instinct, to foster and preserve the feeling of class or group solidarity by the adoption of a mode of speech belonging uniquely and exclusively to the class.

Les Différentes Justices. R. DE LA GRASSERIE. *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 1904.

There are four types of justice, or four methods of securing justice: abstract justice, the justice of equity, concrete justice and '*justice globale*.' Of these, that designated abstract is the most absolute and formal. It secures its end by a procedure rigorously mathematical or syllogistic in character; given the law as the major premise, the fact to be passed on as the minor, the conclusion follows inevitably. Time, place, circumstance, or the characters of the parties concerned are irrelevant. The Roman civil law is a good instance of this kind of justice. Had Roman law always retained this inflexibility and disregard for the fuller demands of the concrete situation, it would have forfeited the immense influence it has had historically. However, the Roman '*droit prétorien*' developed side by side with the '*droit civil pur*' and introduced into it an element of variability, and adaptability to the needs of the individual case. That is, it took into account qualifying circumstances, the good or bad faith of the parties, etc.

The 'justice of equity' and 'concrete justice' are further developments of the principles exhibited in the Roman '*droit prétorien*.' They differ from each other only in the field of their application; equity deals with questions of right (*droit*), concrete justice with questions of fact (*fait*). Both pay full justice to the peculiar necessities of the specific situations. Concrete justice, for instance, attempts to look into the character of the criminal, his past as well as his present, his antecedents, his associates, his opportunities. This type of procedure has the advantage of recognizing the individual and the obligations of society to him, but there is danger of its degenerating into a deliverance of convictions based upon mere personal bias. An obvious disadvantage of this method as weighed against that of abstract justice is that it introduces an incalculable element and thus threatens the stability of the social structure. When a delinquent can anticipate the exact penalty consequent upon his transgressions against the law

he exercises more control over his inclinations than he would were the chance of an indulgent disposition of his case present.

The last type of justice discussed is called by the author justice 'globale.' It is a sort of collective or class justice which is everywhere operative as exercised by one class against another, by the people against a corporation or a particular profession, or by one race against another. Examples of the 'globale' justice are abundant in history. The treatment of the nobles by the common people in the war of the French revolution, or in modern times the lynching of the negro who has committed a crime against the white race of the United States, are some of the most obvious illustrations.

The psychological temper which characterizes these various types of justice is suggestive. Abstract justice makes its appeal to the satisfaction of the intellect in solving a problem with logical neatness and dispatch; equity and concrete justice are based upon feeling — sympathetic insight; justice globale harks back to primitive impulses of self defense or preservation of the group.

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Les Mystiques, Étude psychologique et sociale. PAUL HERMANT.
Revue de Synthèse Historique, Juin, 1905.

The writer finds that mysticism has appeared in its most pronounced form in societies and individuals dominated by a crushing authority so firmly established that the individual cannot hope to realize in fact the society of love and of sympathy of which he has dreamed. To his imagination, thus forced back upon itself, this ideal appears in an amplitude of perfection, unfronted by the difficulties in the way of actual realization.

As a result of these conditions mysticism arises, and M. Hermant believes that the psychological processes through which mystics of all ages have passed are fundamentally the same. These processes appear most clearly in the consideration of the extreme form of the mystic state, — ecstasy. This is simply attention carried to its highest degree of concentration. Desire and attention are centered upon a concept, of certain amplitude and intensity, and all other sensations, desires, and thoughts are suppressed and ignored. In this respect ecstasy is similar to the hypnotic state, the difference being in the nature of the image upon which attention is centered. This total concentration explains why the mystic, upon awakening from the ecstatic state, is unable to recall clearly the intermediate states through

which he has passed. His whole attention has been given to the central idea.

Baffled in his attempts at objective realization, the mystic seeks in contemplation the infinite and unchangeable happiness of the beings with which he is in sympathy. In God, the summation of love, perfection, goodness, truth and beauty, the mystic finds all his aspirations realized.

There is a close parallel between the procedure of the mystic and that of the natural scientist. The latter seeks to interpret the universe in terms of his most constant sensations, notably those of the muscular sense, and reduces the world to ether, atoms, or a mathematical point. Likewise the mystic looks into an ideal world which he interprets in terms of his own emotion, and sees the whole world animated by love and united in God, who to him is simple abstraction (as is the mathematical point) and yet the source of all things.

Since to obey this inner God is a reaction against arbitrary, external authority, we naturally find in mystics frequently a reaction against dogma and ecclesiastical authority. Love is its own law. In extreme cases ordinary virtues are despised; attaining God is attaining perfection, and the mystic feels that he has transcended the bounds of right and wrong, and becomes oblivious even to the claims of wife and children.

The foregoing M. Hermant designates as the *inductive* phase of mystic love, — the period of abstraction. As in science there is also a *deductive* phase in which the hypothesis is led back and applied to concrete facts, so in mysticism a phase appears in which the mystic recognizes God in all things and loves them as divine. This phase is to be treated in a subsequent contribution.

In establishing each point M. Hermant quotes freely from Hindu, Chinese, Arabic, and Neo-Platonic, as well as Christian mystics of all ages.

Introduction à l'étude de la Psychologie des Elites de la Démocratie.

N. VASCHIDE et G. BINET-VALMER. *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Août-Sept., 1905.

The writers are firm believers in the doctrine of a social *élite*, and are followers of Nietzsche. All progress is due to the initiative of a military and intellectual *élite*. Such an *élite* does not simply re-echo the opinions and ideals of the nation at large; it makes and transforms them. Democracies do not give proper opportunity for the development of the social *élite*, which is essential to progress. "Democra-

cies, at any rate the French democracy, at the present time systematically neglect the *élite* individual. They desire that the heroes whom they admire, protect and elevate above themselves, shall be wholly divested of their own individuality, and be merely the echo of the desires and tastes of social groups. The masses admire themselves in their representatives, and they admire only their representatives."

Human evolution has always been guided by individuals. "As soon as an association is formed to impose a new conception upon the multitude, other superior individuals set themselves to work, and it is their work which prepares the future. All the great scientific discoveries, all the great religious, metaphysical, and social ideas are the work of individuals. But some pretend that these individuals, on the contrary, are merely the echo of groups, the representatives of the universal science which was contemporary to them. To this one must reply: If Lamarck and Newton, for example, have profited by this science, it is certainly due to themselves and thanks to their mysterious genius * * * that the synthesis was produced from all the elements furnished (we agree to it) by the organized *élites* * * *. So that if the members of the *élite* are the echoes of the learned mob, let us say that they return to the mob its voice so transformed that it does not recognize it. And this transformation, which is the proper work of isolated individuals, justly represents progress."

The new *élite*, found in democracies, is not a *fixed élite* representing intellectual or military excellences, and capable of leading to further progress, but a *mobile élite*, reflecting merely the average and necessarily mediocre and unprogressive ideal of the nation at large. Wise monarchs recognized and encouraged men of genius. But a man of genius cannot appeal to the intelligence of a mob! Modern democracy is more oppressive to the intellectual *élite* than any monarchy or religious caste could be. The whole scheme of education in France is calculated to crush out individuality.

Progress is the result of the contention between opposing forces. Destruction must precede reorganization. This is typified in the work of founders of dynasties. But a democracy attempts to keep opposing forces in equilibrium, and so neither destruction nor reconstruction can take place. "A perfect democracy seems devoted entirely to immobility." To avoid reaching a dead level of mediocrity, we must have the free play and spontaneity of action which conflicts and revolutions afford, and which allow a truly intellectual *élite* to develop.

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Essai sur la psychologie des races nègres de l'Afrique tropicale.

AD. CUREAU. *Revue générale des Sciences pures et appliquées*, 1904. Pp. 638 ff.

The negro races as compared with civilized peoples have great similarity in mental traits, yet the forest peoples show some marked differences from the peoples living in the open. The former are distrustful, cautious, deceitful, and when mingling with other men in the open are ill at ease. The man of the plains and rivers, on the other hand, corresponds to the more open and cheerful environment. He is gay, exuberant, a lover of noise and song. He is naïve, trustful, hospitable, honorable in business matters, not lacking in generosity, with a rare talent for the comic side of persons and things. His language is sonorous, with a large proportion of vowels and labials, whereas the idiom of the forest people has a nasal and guttural character. (M. Cureau does not state what are the relative sizes of the groups. If, as is often the case, the plain groups are larger, this may be one factor in the difference.) In general the senses of the negro are less acute, his emotions rise and fall easily, he lives in the present with less memory and less forethought than the white. It is not accurate to call him lazy; he is only unoccupied; he on his part can not understand the restless agitation of the white. An evidence that it is not the dislike of labor which moves him is seen in the fact that in bargaining he values commodities solely by his wants, not at all by the labor he has used or must use to produce them. Intellectual development proceeds rapidly up to puberty—indeed the young black is more precocious than the average European—but from this time on there is arrest or even a slight decline. The languages show some interesting indications of the teleological motive in the formation of terms: the same word signifies 'animal' and 'food'; the same word stands for tree and stick. On the other hand they distinguish by different terms the heat of a hearth or other hot body from that of the sun, and the light of the sun from that of the moon. Another interesting fact is that such qualities as weight, hardness, resistance or elasticity are not separated from the feeling of effort involved in dealing with them; they are spoken of as 'strong,' etc. There is little æsthetic expression except in music, which is characterized by the repetitions common among primitive peoples.

J. H. T.

GENERAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

The Present Problems of Social Psychology. EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. Amer. J. of Sociol., Jan., 1905.

Human psychology may be divided into General (dealing with things common to all minds) and Special (dealing with differentiae that mark off one category of minds from another). General psychology may in turn be divided into individual (mind as acted upon by things) and inter-individual. Special psychology deals with (1) anthropic varieties, such as races, sexes, and (2) with social varieties, such as nationalities and classes. Social psychology should include not only inter-individual psychology, but also the differential psychology of people reared in different civilizations, social formations, family types, etc. Inter-individual psychology deals with (1) personal relationships and (2) social groupings. The former has been well explored. What we lack is a clear notion of how 'personal relationships' produce such massive products as languages, myths, customs, proverbs, and folk-lore. They are not mere 'collective products,' nor 'superimposed.' They depend upon innumerable molecular occurrences too petty to challenge general attention. What concerns us here is that society transforms, socializes its members. New properties appear, depending not upon the original elements only, but also upon their mode of combination (morphological) and their manner of interaction (psychological). A group-individuality arises, trenching upon personal individuality. The problem of social groupings is distinct from that of personal relations. Personal relations may furnish a plane of agreement, such as a common speech. But only in some such relation as that of compatriots do the new properties of leader, dynasty, etc., appear.

Collective psychology has taken in hand the subjective aspects of human groupings. It has exposed the pointless antithesis of 'individual, society,' 'society, individual.' But too often the investigator has imagined the sort of association in a particular group a pattern for all. We should stop trying to unlock all doors with one key and classify groupings into *genera* and *species* according to broad psychic characteristics. The next task is so to graduate them as to reveal principal degrees of socialization from absolute individual to completest group ego. We find the units progressively grouping themselves because of (1) mental agreement, (2) spiritual resemblances, (3) for coördinating like efforts, (4) unlike efforts, (5) through directive organs, (6) by restraining aggressive members

(juristic rules), and (7) by organs (festivals, etc.) instituted to promote a completer socialization.

A more difficult task is to determine the *causes* and *conditions* of these levels. Some will be morphological; others psychological. Understanding these levels, their causes and conditions, we could perhaps plot the life-curve of a group.

But some particular problems for collective psychology: Which architect is the chief builder, resemblance or community of interest? If resemblances (color, physique), what is the relative importance of the various sorts of resemblances (and differences)? Is agreement in feeling more socializing than agreement in intellectual qualities?

It is not entirely clear under what conditions classes will feel and act together. For example, does not the secret hope of rising prompt many to identify themselves in imagination with *the class they hope to belong to*? If so, what significance has this fact for the mutual problems of the workingmen and the employers? What significance regarding the ultimate decomposition of the national life into hostile classes? Further, with the growth of group-individuality what is the fate of personal individuality?

As to the special psychology of nationalities and classes: Are differences in national traits due primarily to race endowment or to situation and history? Once a Turk is not always a Turk. Here is work for the race psychologist and for the social psychologist.

Passing from the differentiae of peoples to their broad psychic differences, we find various classes—the married, unmarried; master, slave, etc.—which are of societal origin, and hence belong to social psychology. A systematic survey of class types should be helpful for general sociology. Only as we know these classes thoroughly—slavery, militancy, ecclesiasticism—can we rightly value them.

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Sociological Papers. FRANCIS GALTON and others. London and New York, Published for the Sociological Society by Macmillan and Company, 1905. Pp. xi + 292.

The Society may be congratulated upon this volume which represents the first year of its activity. The papers by V. V. Brandford and E. Durkheim on 'The Relations of Sociology to the Social Sciences' and to 'Philosophy' are accompanied by some thirty communications from the leaders in this field, and make an interesting symposium. There is little of a specifically psychological nature except in the let-

ter of Fouillée who regards social psychology as the distinctive feature of sociology. He understands it to be the province of sociology to consider phenomena due (1) to reciprocal (psychological) influence — states of consciousness determining states of consciousness through the medium of society; and (2) to the reaction of the whole social self upon itself, or of the whole assemblage of social phenomena upon themselves. These are the 'two collective processes of mutual determinism and auto-determinism.'

Francis Galton contributed a paper on Eugenics, to which is annexed an investigation by the same author on the achievements of the near kinsfolk of some of the Fellows of the Royal Society. The Fellows in question certainly have brilliant kin, and the kind of ability displayed would be little aided by social position, though of course the intellectual stimulus from living in a family of geniuses must be something. E. Westermarck finds indications that the position of women in early civilization is not so servile as is often supposed. Other papers are by P. Geddes on 'Civics' and by P. H. Mann on 'Life in an Agricultural Village in England.' This latter reveals a distressing condition.

J. H. T.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS.

Aspects of Social Evolution. First Series, Temperaments. J. LIONEL TAYLER, M.R.C.S. London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1904. Pp. xxviii + 297.

This book represents a working out of three fairly distinct lines of thought which may be roughly characterized as (1) an argument from a neo-Darwinian standpoint regarding the problem of physical heredity, (2) a diagnosis from a physician's standpoint of various types of temperament, and (3) criticism and exhortation from a social reformer's standpoint with reference to the crying evils of modern society.

Dr. Tayler's argument regarding the problem of physical heredity discloses no novel features. It is essentially a recapitulation of well-known facts and generalizations derived mainly from the labors of Spencer, Darwin and Weissmann. The conclusion reached is that natural selection acting upon a fundamentally unmodifiable protoplasm has been and is the sole method of evolution. The metaphysical or even the logical contradictions involved in such a conclusion as this, though hardly to be escaped when thus started from the cover of biological details, are not pursued, if perceived; for the author seems to be chiefly intent upon another trial — sociological applications. In

the first place, according to the author's view of the biological principles thus derived, it becomes of fundamental importance to discriminate amongst the various types of human individuals with a view to discovering what types ought to survive because they are fitted for a higher social life. In the second place, it becomes of equal importance to determine how to modify the environment, both physical and social, so as to select and perpetuate the most desirable types. Out of these two reciprocal considerations grow the latter two thirds of the volume—the study of temperaments, and the social and medical aspects of the problem.

The author's treatment of temperaments proceeds largely from the physiological standpoint, with special reference to questions of health and disease. In fact the author states, in so many words, that 'the study of temperament is concerned *solely* with peculiarities which have a physiological significance, and which are found in certain large groups of individuals who appear to be healthily organized, as far as known data permit of our estimating accurately what is or is not healthy' (p. 100). Great prominence is given to the temperamental influence of glandular organs. Evolutionary tendencies now at work receive some attention. The author notes, for example, the passing of the traditional John Bull type, its place being taken by a thinner, more alert, active type, just as the old mammoth and larger reptilian forms of animals have been displaced by others smaller and better adapted to newer environments. The following types of temperament are discriminated with special reference to physical, mental, social, medical, educational and artistical characteristics, and each type is illustrated by a full page half-tone reproduction of a crude and fanciful sort of composite sketch: (1) The long-limbed northern type (pre-civilized), (2) the short-limbed southern type (pre-civilized), (3) the mediæval type, (4) the scientific type, (5) the rational type, (6) the emotional type, (7) the womanly type, (8) the manly type.

In his discussion of the social and medical aspects of the problem Dr. Tayler seems to be able to find no language too strong with which to condemn the existing industrial conditions, particularly as they affect the lot of women, and the production of social extremes—the parasitic rich and the parasitic poor—the 'scum' and the 'dreg.' This part of the book is unmistakably written out of first hand, flesh and blood experience. It voices an emphatic human protest against the dehumanizing tendencies of modern society. As a conclusion derived from three years of work in a poor populous district comes the statement (the italics are the author's): '*The worst sin of our age is the*

conscious, deliberate, devitalizing and dewomanizing of women by modern commercialism.'

The book as a whole is essentially humanitarian, rather than definitely scientific in its spirit and scope, utilizing results of scientific investigation, particularly those available in English—references to studies on the same subject in French and in German being conspicuous by their absence—but making in return no scientific contribution, save on the level of reflecting, too faithfully, if anything, some of the aspects of the chaos of human life.

W. C. GORE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

BOOKS RECEIVED FROM NOVEMBER 5 TO DECEMBER 5.

The Educative Process. W. C. BAGLER. New York, Macmillans, 1905. Pp. xix + 358.

The Interpretation of Nature. C. LLOYD MORGAN. Bristol, Arrowsmith; London, Macmillans, 1905. Pp. 164 (12mo).

Wasps, Social and Solitary. G. W. and E. G. PECKHAM. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. Pp. xvi + 311.

Mexico, Its Social Evolution. Various authors. Ed. by J. SIERRA. Eng. trans. by G. SENTIÑON. Mexico, Ballescá & Co. 2 tomes in 3 large 4to vols. Profusely illustrated in half-tone, lithographs and in color. Pp. 415, 778.

[A superb and sumptuous work, treating of all aspects of the Mexican Republic from the points of view of history and social evolution. Mechanically it is an example of the best Spanish work, having been printed and illustrated in Barcelona. The only criticism that could be offered would terminate on the somewhat grandiose English of the translator.]

Die Lehre vom Denken; zur Ergänzung der naturwissenschaftlichen Psychologie in Anwendung auf die Geisteswissenschaften. III. Th. Berlin, Dümmler; New York, Stechert, 1905. Pp. 303.

Measurements of Twins. E. L. THORNDIKE. Columbia University Cont. to Philos. and Psychol., XIII., 3. (Archives of Philos. etc., No. 1.) New York, Science Press, 1905. Pp. 64. [The Columbia University Monographs in Psychology, formerly printed in the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW Monograph Supplements, are hereafter, we understand, to appear only in the above form.]

- Psychologie de l'Enfant et Pédagogie expérimentale.* Dr. ED. CLAPARÈDE. Geneva, Kündig, 1905. Pp. 77.
- Great Pedagogical Essays.* F. V. N. PAINTER. New York, Amer. Book Co., 1905. Pp. 426.
- Le Langage. Essai sur la Psychologie normale et pathologique.* E.-B. LEROY. Paris, Alcan, 1905. Pp. 293. 5 fr.
- Mexican Antiquities.* Bulletin 28, Bureau Amer. Ethnology. Washington, Gov. Printing Office, 1904. Pp. 682. [A collection and translation of papers by Seler, Förstemann, Schellhas, Sapper, and Dieseldorff, supervised by C. P. Bowditch.]
- Ricerche di Psicologia.* Vol. 1. Directed by F. DE SARLO for the Istituto di Studi Superiori of Florence (Lab. di Psicologia sperimentale). Florence, Seeber, 1905. Pp. 245. L. 10. [To be continued serially.]
- Criminal Responsibility.* CH. MERCIER. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1905. Pp. 232. 7s. 6d.
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* N. S., Vol. V. London, Williams & Norgate, 1905. Pp. 188. 10s. 6d. net.
- Psychologische Untersuchungen.* Bd. 1. Heft 1. *Bewusstsein und Gegenstände.* TH. LIPPS. Leipzig, Engelmann, 1905. Pp. 203. M. 5.60. [The first issue of a new series to be edited by Professor Lipps.]
- The Secret of the Totem.* ANDREW LANG. London, New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. Pp. x + 215. \$3.
- Life and Matter.* O. LODGE. New York and London, Putnams, 1905. Pp. 175. [A criticism of Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*.]
- L'Âme et le Corps.* A. BINET. Paris, Flammarion, 1905. Pp. 288.

NOTES AND NEWS.

PROFESSOR H. K. WOLFE has been appointed to a new chair of educational psychology at the University of Nebraska. He was formerly professor of psychology at this institution and is now professor of philosophy at the University of Montana.

DR. JAMES CARLETON BELL has been appointed instructor in experimental psychology at Wellesley College. Dr. Bell spent one year in the Psychological Laboratory at Leipzig, and the following

two years in graduate study at Harvard University where he took his doctor's degree. Dr. Bell shares with Professor Gamble the direction of the training course in laboratory psychology and of the research work.

ELIZABETH KEMPER ADAMS, A.B. (Vassar), Ph.D. (Chicago), has been appointed instructor in philosophy and pedagogy at Smith. Anna A. Cutler, Ph.D., has been promoted from an associate to a full professorship in the department.

THE American Psychological Association will meet in Cambridge (Mass.), December 27-29, in affiliation with the American Philosophical Association. There will be a joint session on Wednesday afternoon, including a discussion on 'The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the Natural Sciences.' Professors Fullerton, Hall, Münsterburg, Taylor, Thilly and Witmer are to speak. A Conference of the Psychological Association has also been arranged to consider 'Coöperation between Laboratories and Departments of Different Institutions.' Further details of the meeting will be given in the final program.

THE Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology is to meet in New Orleans during the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

THE following items are taken from the press:

PROFESSOR R. M. WENLEY, of the University of Michigan, has leave of absence for the year, which he is spending in Switzerland.

ELMER E. POWELL, Ph.D. (Bonn), has been appointed to the chair of philosophy at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.

CLARK WISSLER, Ph.D., and Berthold Laufer, Ph.D., have been appointed lecturers in anthropology at Columbia University.

CHARLES J. C. BENNETT, Ph.D. (Columbia), has been appointed professor of education in the Louisiana State University.

Dr. W. G. SMITH has been appointed lecturer in experimental psychology at the University of Liverpool.

THE next meeting of the German Society of Experimental Psychology will be held at Würzburg, April 10-13, 1906.

H. C. STEVENS, Ph.D. (Cornell), has been appointed assistant professor of psychology at the University of Washington, Seattle.

MR. WALTER B. PITKIN has been appointed lecturer in philosophy at Columbia University.

PROFESSOR H. EBBINGHAUS, of the University of Breslau, has been called to the University of Halle, to succeed Professor A. Riehl.

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
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